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ARGUMENT 
I. Absent a showing of reasonable suspicion, Law Enforcement 
exceeded the permissible scope of detention for a traffic 
stop when they continued to detain and question Defendant 
about matters which where unrelated to the initial stop. 
The State, does not challenge Defendant's first argument 
that, absent reasonable suspicion, the second time officers 
approached the vehicle they exceeded the scope of a traffic stop 
detention. Brief of Appellee at 11, 17. The Trial Court found 
that Officer Anderson's first question to the other occupant of 
the vehicle was outside of the scope of the traffic detention. 
R.37:56. 
Defendant does not dispute that Officer Anderson had a 
justifiable reason to stop and detain the vehicle and its driver 
for purposes of a traffic stop. However, the scope of that 
detention was exceeded when both Officers' decided to approach 
the vehicle and interrogate the Defendant about unrelated 
matters; "the length and scope of the detention must be strictly 
tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its 
initiation permissible." R.37:16; R.42:19; State v. Johnson, 805 
P.2d 761, 763. (Utah 1991). Absent reasonable suspicion of 
further criminal activity, the second approach interrogation, 
exceeded the scope of a permissible traffic stop. State v. 
Cotero, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994). 
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II. Upon approaching the vehicle the second time, Officers 
Anderson and Archuletta did not have a reasonable suspicion 
that the Defendant had been, was, or was about to engage in 
criminal activity. 
Prior to a court finding that officers have reasonable 
suspicion to detain a defendant, a court must first examine the 
facts available to the officers before that detention began. 
State v. Alvarez, 2006 UT P15, P16 (Utah 2006). In Alvarez, the 
police officers detained a man who they suspected was involved 
with the possession and distribution of narcotics. Id. The 
Officers were aware of the following information: 
1) information from an unidentified source that drug 
transactions were occurring in the area that the defendant 
Alvarez was frequenting; 
2) information reported to one officer by the Salt Lake City 
Narcotics Unit, that the vehicle the defendant was driving 
had been used in a recent drug transaction, 20 blocks from 
the defendant's current location; 
3) the vehicle the defendant was driving had within it an 
image of Jesus Malverde; 
4) the vehicle the defendant was driving had in its interior 
a small water bottle; 
5) the vehicle the defendant was driving was uninsured; 
6) one officer had observed the defendant enter the same 
condominium, which both officers had just observed him 
enter, at approximately the same time of the day and 
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remain inside for approximately the same amount of time; 
7) and both officers observed the defendant enter the same 
condominium which he had entered the previous day at 
approximately the same time of day and remain inside the 
condominium for approximately the same amount of time. 
The Court held that these facts allowed the officers to 
temporarily detain the defendant for reasonable suspicion of 
possible criminal activity. Id. 
In this case, as Officer Anderson approached the vehicle for 
the Second time with Officer Achuletta, he was aware of the 
following facts: 
1) that the vehicle, not the Defendant, had been seen earlier at 
the Riverside Motel1, R. 37:16, 42:20-21; 
2) that the occupants of the vehicle were acting nervous,2 R. 
37:16, R. 42:10; 
1
 The Riverside Motel is a multiple residence unit in 
Helper, Utah, where people live and it is legal to visit. R. 
37:38. The officers in this case testified that they were aware 
of some recent illegal drug activity that had occurred at the 
Riverside Motel. R. 37:6. 
2
 Contrary to the State's assertion Officer Anderson only 
described the Defendant's conduct as that of extreme nervousness. 
R.37:16, R42:10. Officer Anderson did not testify that the 
Defendant behaved in any evasive manner. Id. Officer Archuletta 
contrary to his sworn testimony at the Preliminary Hearing and 
the Suppression Hearing did not have any contact with the 
Defendant prior to the initiation of the extended detention. 
R.37:34. 
Defendant objects to the State's characterization that his 
conduct or behavior was evasive at anytime prior to the extended 
detention. 
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3)that it was approximately 3:00 a.m. in the morning, R.37:5; 
4)that there was an unconnected amplifier on the floor of the 
vehicle, R.42:7. 
Officer Archuletta as he approached the vehicle for the first 
time was aware of the following: 
1) he had seen two unidentified people working on the vehicle's 
driver's side door approximately two hours before, from a 
distance of approximately 20 feet, while he was driving the 
past the Riverside Motel. R.37:32,38.3 4 
In Alverez, the Utah Supreme Court was careful to emphasize 
that the facts in that case supported a finding of reasonable 
suspicion at its bare minimums; "[T]he totality of the facts 
barely meets the threshold of reasonable and articulable 
suspicion" . . . and that "the absence of any one of the facts 
[would] have dictated a different decision." Alverez at P19.. 
The facts of this case are significantly less than those in 
3
 Contrary to the State's assertion there is nothing in the 
record to indicate that Officer Archuletta recognized the men he 
observed were working on the door that night. State's Brief at 
12. The State's use of the Officers' statements to the Defendant 
and the driver in the videotape are not indicative of what the 
officer knew or who he recognized. They are not sworn statements 
and could have easily been an interrogation tactic to attempt to 
get the Defendant to admit something by feigning knowledge of the 
event. 
4
 Neither Officer Anderson or Officer Archuletta testified 
that in their experience and training it was common for people to 
hide drugs in a vehicle's doors. Officer Archuletta did not 
identify this as a concern nor did he indicate, in his testimony 




The Court held in Alvarez, that it was very significant that 
there had been direct testimony from the arresting officer 
indicating that consistent with his training and experience, the 
repetitive and observed behavior of the defendant, returning to 
the same location, at the same time of day, for a short period of 
time, was indicative of the behavior of a drug dealer. Id. at P3-4. 
In this case there was no such testimony or evidence. 
Officer Anderson observed, the early morning hour, the 
Defendant's nervousness, and an unhooked amplifier. R.37:5,16; 
R.42:7,20-21. Officer Archuletta told Officer Anderson that the 
vehicle had been at the Riverside Motel two hours earlier. 
R.37:6; R.42:6. In Alvarez, the vehicle that the defendant was 
driving had been seen a least three times at two different drug 
locations. Alvarez, at P3-4. Two of those three times the 
defendant was driving the suspected vehicle. Id. The officers did 
not know whether the Defendant was at Riverside Motel. That the 
Defendant was a passenger in a car that had been seen at a 
Riverside Motel is not indicative of criminal activity. Yabarra 
v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979). 
In both Alvarez, and Terry v. Ohio, innocuous behavior 
became reasonably suspicious when that behavior was repeatedly 
observed or corroborated. Alvarez, at P18; Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 6-7 (1968). In this case, prior to officer's approaching 
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the vehicle the second time and commencing their prolonged 
detention of the Defendant, there was no such repeated behavior 
nor was there any distinct behavior that officers' testified was 
in their experience indicative of criminal activity. 
It is not the Defendant's intention to use a "divide and 
conquer analysis," in his appeal of the Trial Court's incorrect 
suppression ruling. Alvarez, at P18; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
6-7 (1968). Objectively the continued detention of the defendant 
was not justifiable. 
The early hour, Defendant's nervous behavior, and the 
unhooked amplifier, although innocent enough, might be considered 
as part of a reasonable suspicion analysis. However, they should 
not be given more weight than the image of Jesus Malvida and the 
small water bottle in Alverez. Alverez at P16. 
Admittedly, the most suspicious fact of which they were 
aware was the previous location of the vehicle. R.37:32,38. 
However, this single sighting had occurred at least two hours 
earlier. R.37:31. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the 
Defendant was ever at the Riverside Motel. 
It was only from the double interrogation of the Defendant 
and the other occupant that the zig-zag papers, the speaker bags, 
the tobacco pipe, and the coin were observed. The only reason 
the officers engaged in this interrogation technique was to find 
out more about why the vehicle and the driver had been at the 
Riverside Motel. R.37:24, 42:21. Prior to approaching the 
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vehicle the second time, the officers had nothing more than an 
hunch that the Defendant may have been involved in criminal 
activity. Id. 
It is at this moment that the unauthorized detention of the 
Defendant began. The questions posed to him were accusatory and 
outside the scope of a routine traffic stop. The evidence in 
this case should be suppressed. 
III. Defendant's criminal history is not a factor which is to be 
considered in an analysis of whether it is reasonable to 
suspect him of current criminal activity. 
In April of 2003 the Utah Supreme Court held, 
Those asking us to overturn prior precedent have a 
substantial burden of persuasion due to the doctrine of 
stare decisis. ... When we are clearly convinced that a 
rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound 
because of changing conditions and that more good than 
harm will come by departing form precedent we are not 
inexorably bound by our own precedents. 
State v. Machley, 67 P.3d 477, 480 (Utah 2003). 
The State, has not met the Mauchley standard. Id. Its request 
that State v. Brooks and State v. Ranquist be overruled is 
improper, see Brief and Appellee at 15; State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 
640 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); State v. Ranquist, 128 P.3d 1201 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2005). 
For this court to hold that a person's past recorded 
criminal conduct allows an officer to suspect that person of 
recent criminal activity, diminishes the protections afforded all 
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citizens under the 4th Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the 
U.S. and Utah Constitutions. U.S. Constitution. Amend. IV; UT. 
Const, art. I § 14 (West 2006). It discourages change among 
those who commit crimes, by never allowing a restoration of their 
right to privacy. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence presented to the Trial Court at either hearing 
viewed subjectively or objectively was not sufficient to support 
a finding of reasonable suspicion to justify a prolonged 
detention. Defendant respectfully requests that the Trial 
Court's ruling on the suppression of evidence be reversed. 
DATED this _/f_ day of January, 2007. 
Samuel S. Bailey 
Attorney for the Defendant 
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